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• International labour migration can reduce poverty for migrants themselves, their families, and their 
host and origin countries. It is therefore crucial to achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1.
•  Yet, migration does not always achieve its poverty reduction potential. This is due to the high costs 
involved, poor conditions in host countries, and barriers to mobility.
•  To reap the benefits, states should increase and diversify safe, regular and orderly migration 
pathways in line with demand for migrant labour, and make these easier to access.
•  Remittances are a powerful poverty reduction instrument. They should be encouraged by origin 
countries and the private sector. Transfer costs should be lowered. States should also lower the 
costs and bureaucratic requirements for those wishing to migrate.
• Evidence is needed on the mechanisms through which migration impacts on poverty. Better 
longitudinal data would help understand these pathways and target policies effectively.
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1 Introduction 
This briefing considers the extent to which international 
labour migration can reduce poverty, and the implications 
this has for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(2030 Agenda). Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 
1 calls for ‘ending poverty in all its forms everywhere’. 
Labour migration can help achieve this goal, having 
been described as ‘the most effective contribution we can 
make to improving the lives of the world’s working poor’ 
(Rodrik, 2007). In this briefing, we show that international 
labour migration is a powerful tool to reduce poverty, 
for migrants themselves, their families, and their host and 
origin countries. 
In 2015, over 243 million people (3% of the global 
population) lived outside their country of origin. The 
growth of financial transfers made by these migrants 
(‘remittances’) has rapidly accelerated. Remittance flows 
to developing countries are now four times larger than 
official development assistance (ODA) (Global Knowledge 
Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), 
2017) and are estimated to touch the lives of over one 
billion people. In certain settings, migration has been 
shown to be more effective at reducing poverty than other 
development programmes (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014).
Tackling the different facets of poverty is one of the key 
aims of the 2030 Agenda. Poverty is multidimensional; 
encompassing both monetary measures and other 
dimensions such as living standards, health, and education 
access and quality (Alkire and Santos, 2010). Labour 
migration1 can reduce poverty for migrants themselves, 
their families, and their host and origin countries. 
Migrants and their families benefit from increased income 
and knowledge, which allows them to spend more on 
basic needs, access services, and make investments. In 
1. This briefing focuses on international labour migrants (or ‘migrant workers’), defined as individuals who moved from one country to another for the 
purpose of employment (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2011). Where the briefing refers to other types of migrants, for example 
internal migrants, this will be stated explicitly. Most of the evidence focuses on migration to the global North, although we do also include examples of 
South-South migration.
2. In this briefing we include studies considering the income and welfare gains from migration, which are an indicator of its potential to reduce poverty. 
However, it should be kept in mind that they may not always translate into a reduction of poverty at the national level.
host countries, immigration can have positive economic 
effects through increased production and labour-market 
specialisation. In origin countries, migration can lead 
to higher economic growth through increased incomes 
and spending, investment by migrant households, and 
knowledge transfers. However, migration does not always 
achieve this potential, nor are the outcomes always 
beneficial, due to a number of barriers. These include 
the financial costs of migration itself, conditions in host 
countries, and barriers to mobility. 
The beginning of this briefing presents evidence 
demonstrating the potential of migration to reduce poverty. 
Section 3 links this evidence to the 2030 Agenda, arguing 
that migration should be considered a means to meet the 
SDGs, especially Goals 1, 8 and 10, and their Targets, 
especially 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.a and 1.b. Section 4 considers 
why migration’s poverty reduction potential is not always 
met, and what to do about it. Section 5 concludes, and 
offers recommendations to boost this potential.
2 How can migration reduce poverty?
Migration can result in positive economic and social 
benefits, for migrants themselves, their families, and 
their host and origin countries. In particular, migration 
is a powerful poverty reduction tool, with the potential 
to substantially increase incomes for migrants and their 
families.2 
2.1 Impacts on migrants and their families
Migration can reduce poverty of both migrants themselves 
and their families in countries of origin. It can do this 
through remittances, as well as other mechanisms, 
including knowledge and norm transfers, in-kind transfers 
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Migration is one of the defining features of the 21st century and significantly contributes to economic and social development everywhere. As such, 
migration will be key to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
In a series of eight briefings, ODI, with the support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), explains the relationship between 
migration and critical development issues that are central to the SDGs. The briefings provide a set of recommendations for governments and policy-
makers tasked with delivering the 2030 Agenda.
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(e.g. assets) and changing household dynamics.3 While 
most studies focus on South-North migration, similar 
mechanisms hold for South-South movements; effects will 
of course vary based on context, but likely not enormously.
Labour migration can have a direct, immediate and 
substantial effect on the poverty of migrants themselves 
due to increases in income. A typical worker from an 
average developing country would earn 2.5-3 times their 
income if they moved to the United States (US) (Clemens et 
al., 2009). Migration resulted in a 263% income gain for 
Tongans in New Zealand (McKenzie et al., 2010; Box 4); 
and 1,400% for Haitians migrating temporarily to the US 
(Clemens and Postel, 2017; Box 1). Migration within the 
global South can also result in income gains of up to 60% 
(Ratha and Shaw, 2007). The families of the migrant can 
also experience gains in income, mainly through remittance 
receipts.
These income gains can lead to poverty reduction. 
For example, international migration reduced the level 
of poverty among migrant households in Ecuador by 
between 17% and 21% (Bertoli and Marchetta, 2014).4 
This is a substantial decrease, especially when compared 
to other development programmes – a rigorous review of 
cash transfers showed that impacts on poverty reduction 
range from four to nine percentage points (Bastagli et 
al., 2016). Remittances can also be seen as an informal 
insurance mechanism, helping households cope with 
economic shocks (Stark and Lucas, 1988; Yang, 2008) 
and preventing them from falling deeper into poverty. In 
addition, migrants and their families can become wealthier 
through the accumulation of assets and the ability to make 
more investments (Yang, 2008; de Brauw and Rozelle, 
2008; Mansuri, 2007). 
Migration can influence whether family members in 
origin countries work, and the type of work they do. The 
evidence is mixed and context-specific. In some cases, 
family members work less.5 This effect is often gendered; 
labour-force participation tends to fall more for women in 
households that receive remittances (as Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo, 2006 show for Mexico). Whether this results 
in an increase or decrease in poverty depends on how 
far remittances compensate for work-related income 
3. The impacts of migration are difficult to measure as migrants are not randomly selected but self-select into migration. Therefore migrant-sending 
households can have underlying differences to non-migrant-sending households (e.g. they may be wealthier or more willing to take risks), which means 
comparing them may capture differences in these underlying differences instead of migration effects (Démurger, 2015). This section only cites studies that 
account for selection bias; where this is not the case this will be stated.
4. See also Jimenez-Soto and Brown, 2012 for Tonga.
5. See Adams, 2011 for a review of evidence on this in various countries; Grigorian and Melkonyan, 2011 for Armenia; and Abdulloev et al., 2014 for 
Tajikistan.
6. See also Acosta, 2011 for El Salvador; Yang, 2008 for the Philippines; and Mansuri, 2006 for Pakistan.
7. For more information, see two other briefings in ODI’s Migration and the 2030 Agenda series: on health (Tulloch et al., 2016) and education (Nicolai et 
al., 2017).
8. However, there is also some evidence that the migration of parents or caregivers can have negative impacts on education and health of children and the 
elderly (e.g. Giannelli and Mangiavacchi, 2010 for Albania).
9. For examples of positive effects of migration on investment in education and access for families in countries of origin, see Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2017 and Ambler et al., 2015.
loss. Crucially, migration and remittances can reduce 
child labour, especially among poorer and low-skilled 
households (de Paoli and Mendola, 2017)6, which has 
important implications for long-term poverty reduction. 
Access to education and health are also aspects of 
multidimensional poverty; moreover, they are important 
determinants of long-term poverty. Migration leads 
to improved health, education access and outcomes,7 
particularly for children.8 Migration can also result in 
‘social remittances’ or norm transfers (Levitt, 1998) 
that can have positive effects on individual and family 
wellbeing. For instance, Mexican women whose partners 
migrated internationally had lower smoking rates and 
healthier pregnancies than average through norm transfers 
(Frank, 2005). Having household members working in 
urban areas and abroad was associated with improved 
knowledge of sexual health in rural Guatemalan women 
(Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco, 2005). Again, this has 
important implications for long-term poverty and the 2030 
Agenda more broadly, with migration enabling households 
to become healthier and better educated.9 
2.2 Impacts on origin countries
The previous section discussed how migration has the 
potential to reduce poverty for individuals and households. 
These effects ripple through national economies in origin 
countries: raising incomes, protecting against exogenous 
shocks, and enabling increased economic activity (see 
also Boxes 1 and 4 for effects on national-level gross 
domestic product (GDP)). In fact, most of the benefits to 
national economies accrue through the aggregate effect of 
migration on individual households. Increases in income 
through remittances can result in reductions of poverty 
at the macro-level if poorer households become relatively 
better off: in other words, by changing national inequality 
distributions. This is not a given, however. It depends on 
how income is originally distributed and where migrants 
fall on this spectrum (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007).
Most macro-level analyses investigating cross-country 
national-level poverty rates find that migration (often 
proxied by remittances) does cause a reduction in poverty. 
However, the size of this effect varies considerably 
by study and may be overstated in some cases due to 
methodological concerns. In one study of 10 Latin 
American countries, for every 10% increase in the ratio of 
remittances to GDP, poverty fell between 0.04% to 0.5% 
(Acosta et al., 2008).10
Other studies sum the benefits accrued by individual 
households to estimate the effects on national-level poverty. 
11 This approach reflects the logic explained above, that 
individual- and household-level poverty reduction from 
migration has national impacts in aggregate. For instance, 
a 10 percentage-point increase in international remittances 
in the Philippines caused a 2.8 percentage-point decline in 
the likelihood that a migrant household will be in poverty 
(Yang and Martinez, 2006). This benefit also spills over to 
non-migrant households in high-migration regions, where 
aggregate poverty rates fell by 0.7 percentage points. In 
Ecuador, one study found that migration reduced poverty 
incidence among migrant households by between 17.4% 
and 20.8% (Bertoli and Marchetta, 2014). Along similar 
lines, studies on internal migration in Vietnam and China 
10. See also Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2010; Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2007; and Gupta et al., 2007. The most cited study in this research space is Adams and 
Page (2005), but it does not correct for migrant selection bias.
11. Interestingly, the most cited statistics in this area (five percentage points of poverty reduction in Ghana, six percentage points in Bangladesh, and 11 
percentage points in Uganda) are untraceable to the original source or methodologically less rigorous (e.g. Lokshin et al, 2010; Adams and Cuecuecha, 
2013), implying that the magnitude of poverty reduction effects may be overstated).
12. 38% to 41% for grants to start-up businesses (Blattman and Niehaus, 2014); 20% to 25% for anti-sweatshop activism in Indonesia (Harrison and 
Scorse, 2010); 10% to 30% for productive asset transfers for the ultra-poor (Banerjee et al., 2015).
have found a small yet significant effect on poverty rates 
(De Brauw and Harigaya, 2007 for Vietnam; Yang et al., 
2005 for China). 
Emigration can lead to increased wages for non-
emigrants in origin countries, particularly in the short-
term, which can affect national poverty levels. However, 
this is mainly experienced by those with similar skills to 
emigrants; non-emigrants with complementary skills can 
experience a wage decline (Elsner, 2015).12
2.3 Impacts on host countries
Migration can also reduce poverty and increase growth 
in host countries; through increased productivity, new 
demand for and supply of goods and services, and more 
labour-intensive production. As described in Box 1, a 
programme of temporary agricultural work for Haitians 
added value to the US economy of around US$4,000 
per worker-month. Under New Zealand’s Recognised 
Seasonal Employment programme, employers reported 
increased production through access to a more productive, 
4 ODI Briefing
Box 1: A pilot programme using labour mobility as a tool to reduce poverty
After an earthquake devastated Haiti in 2010, the Center for Global Development (CGD) proposed a novel way 
to help Haitians rebuild their livelihoods: help them migrate. This required opening new legal migration pathways 
between the US and Haiti, a process that culminated five years later when the US Department of State made 
Haitians eligible for temporary work visas. A pilot programme matching Haitian workers to US farms in need of 
agricultural labour soon followed: between 2015 and 2016, 68 workers arrived to work in the US.
The results of a small-sample survey assessing the programme’s impact showed the project differed from 
traditional development aid in three major ways: the size of the income gains; the direct benefit to poor families; 
and the mutual economic benefit to both countries. On average, one month of seasonal agricultural work by a 
male Haitian in the US raised his current wage by approximately 1,400% (Clemens and Postel, 2017). This led to 
a doubling of annual household income in Haiti, with 2-3 months of overseas work by one household member. 
Furthermore, all migrant households reported being able to invest in durable goods and livelihoods, including 
in farming tools and home construction. These gains are much larger than for other poverty-reduction policies, 
which at the high end have been measured at 20-30%.12 And in comparison to aid, where only a portion of total 
project funding reaches the poor, income earned by Haitian seasonal workers in the US went directly to Haitian 
households. 
The programme had effects beyond the household level: for every month of overseas work, approximately 
US$1,700 will eventually be spent in Haiti. These expenditures ripple through the Haitian economy, adding 
an estimated US$3,300 to Haiti’s GDP. Haitian agricultural work also adds value to the US economy by filling 
seasonal workforce needs. By supporting the productivity of US farms, one worker-month of Haitian agricultural 
labour adds approximately $4,000 to US GDP. 
These results suggest unexplored potential for temporary labour mobility as a tool for development and poverty 
reduction. The programme described here faced substantial informational and bureaucratic barriers, but was able 
to operate without any changes to existing legislation in either country. If successfully scaled, 10,000 Haitians 
working in the US for three months a year would add approximately US$100 million annually to the Haitian 
economy.   
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stable workforce. Immigrants also add value to host 
countries through their skills and innovation, fostered by 
diversity; for example, the number of patents applied for 
by immigrants in the US is far greater than their share in 
the population (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010). The 
literature agrees that immigration may encourage natives 
to take up more highly skilled jobs to take advantage 
of skills complementarity; native workers in Denmark 
originally displaced by new refugee arrivals eventually 
earned 3% more through increased specialisation in more 
complex tasks (Foged and Peri, 2015). 
3 Why migration matters for the 2030 
Agenda
As shown, international labour migration is a powerful 
poverty reduction tool, for migrants themselves, their 
families, and their host and origin countries. Therefore, 
migration can be a vital weapon in the arsenal to fight 
poverty, affecting the implementation of SDG 1, as well as 
several other Targets and Goals (see Table 1). These Targets 
cannot be met successfully unless their links to migration 
are considered. 
Targets 1.1 and 1.2 call for an end to poverty around 
the world. As we have seen, migration can be an effective 
instrument in reducing poverty. This is especially the case 
regarding income, where the potential gains are very large 
for migrants and their families, leading to wider positive 
spillover effects. However, labour migrants themselves can 
be highly vulnerable and may need specific support.
Target 1.4 calls for greater access to economic resources, 
financial services and basic services. Labour migration 
can help families in origin countries invest in assets and 
access financial services. Migration can be a form of 
self-insurance; protecting migrant families experiencing 
shocks and stresses. This is relevant for Target 1.5 which 
calls for greater resilience and insurance for individuals 
and families. 
Target 1a calls for better and smarter mobilisation of 
resources for development. We have seen that remittances 
dwarf aid. Remittances, and other forms of diaspora 
financing and investment, can be mobilised to improve 
infrastructure, services and development more generally 
at a community level (see Gelb, forthcoming). Migration 
should be included as a poverty reduction strategy in non-
migration policy frameworks, as called for in Target 1b. 
Migration also affects multidimensional poverty (SDGs 
1, 3 and 4), economic growth and employment (SDG 8), 
and innovation (SDG 9), which can have indirect effects 
on poverty. Finally, it can lead to increases or decreases in 
inequality, relevant to SDG 10. 
Table 1: Poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere
1.1: By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently 
measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day.
1.2: By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and 
children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national 
definitions.
Migration is a powerful poverty reduction strategy for migrants themselves and 
their families in origin countries. The benefits of migration are greater for those 
travelling through regular migration channels, with costs and risks higher for 
those migrants with irregular status (see Section 4). Furthermore, the poorest 
are often unable to benefit from migration, owing to the high costs involved.
Labour migrants in host countries may need specific support as they often face 
unique poverty challenges, for instance because of discrimination and poor 
working and living conditions (see Lucci et al., 2016). Migrants often send a 
high share of their disposable income as remittances which can make them 
impoverished. 
Increased immigration does not lead to higher poverty rates in host countries; in 
fact, migrants often add value to domestic economies.
1.4: By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the 
vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to 
basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, 
inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial 
services, including microfinance.
Migration can help families in origin countries improve their wellbeing through 
increased income and consumption. Indirect effects include higher savings, 
investment and protection from shocks and stresses. Migration can lead 
to family members accessing and using financial services for the first time 
(Anzoategui et al., 2014). It can also improve their ability to invest in assets, 
including land ownership, and increase access to basic services like education 
and healthcare.
Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
1.5: By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations 
and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events 
and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters.
Migration strengthens households’ resilience. It helps families in times of crisis 
by strengthening their ability to cope with economic risks and shocks, through 
informal insurance strategies. Remittances have also been shown to increase 
at times of national shocks and stresses (for instance in the Philippines after 
natural disasters).
1.a: Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, 
including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide 
adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least 
developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in 
all its dimensions.
Remittances and other forms of diaspora financing can be mobilised to improve 
infrastructure, services and development more generally at community level (see 
Gelb, forthcoming). These have been shown to lead to poverty reduction on a 
national level as well. At the same time, remittances, as private funding, do not 
replace aid.
This is recognised in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (June 2015), which states 
the ‘positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable 
development in countries of origin’ (United Nations (UN), 2015). 
1.b: Create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and international 
levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, to 
support accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions.
Migration tends to be overlooked as a poverty reduction strategy in policy 
frameworks, with some policies in origin and host countries limiting mobility. 
Conditions in host countries can also reduce the poverty-reduction potential of 
migration. Sound policy frameworks should consider migration’s role in reducing 
poverty and strive for policy coherence across different sectors. 
Other Goals
Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages. Migration improves healthcare access and health outcomes for families in 
origin countries. However, migrants in host countries often lack access to health 
services (see Tulloch et al., 2016).
Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong 
learning opportunities for all.
Migration helps improve education access and educational outcomes for 
families in origin countries. However, migrant children in host countries often 
suffer disadvantages in accessing quality education (see Nicolai et al., 2017).
Goal 8: Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and 
decent work for all.
Migration, as proxied by remittances, can lead to economic growth in origin 
countries. It can also lead to a reduction in unemployment and higher wages in 
origin countries (Mishra, 2014). 
Labour migrants often face difficult working conditions (see Lucci et al., 2016), 
with stronger regulations and monitoring needed around working conditions and 
recruitment processes (see also Box 3) to achieve decent work for all migrants. 
Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization and foster innovation.
Migration leads to greater diversity in host countries and this can foster 
innovation. 
In origin countries, migration can also foster innovation through social 
remittances, skills transfers and return migration (Debnath, 2016). This has 
implications for long-term poverty reduction in these countries. In some 
contexts, outflows of the highly skilled could have negative impacts for origin 
countries in certain sectors (for example, shortages of healthcare workers, 
Mills et al., 2008). However, evidence that a so-called ‘brain drain’ harms 
development in origin countries is mixed once the net effects are considered. 
High-skilled migration often generates positive externalities such as increased 
investment in education, a more educated domestic workforce, and returnees 
bringing back skills acquired abroad (Adzei and Sakyi, 2014; Docquier and 
Rapoport, 2011). 
Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries. With people migrating from low- to high-income countries and sending 
remittances back home, migration can reduce global inequalities among 
countries, and among people (Milanovic, 2016).
Whether migration reduces inequality within origin countries depends on where 
migrants sit on the income distribution. In some contexts, migration can lead to 
higher inequality as the poorest are often unable to migrate. When the costs of 
migration are reduced, the potential to reduce inequality is also greater.
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4 Why migration’s poverty reduction 
potential is not always met, and what to do 
about it
The financial costs13 associated with the migration process 
can reduce migration’s impact on poverty reduction. 
Further barriers include conditions in host countries, which 
can entrench poverty amongst migrants, and barriers to 
mobility, which often prevent those who would benefit the 
most from migrating from doing so. 
4.1 The financial cost of migration can be high
Migration can incur high costs, even prior to departure. 
This includes the costs of procuring passports14, a visa, 
work permit and/or the recruitment process more generally. 
Migrants may secure the services of a travel agent, migrant 
broker or smuggler, and the costs of the journey itself can 
be high, especially if protracted and/or irregular. These 
costs can be excessive – low-skilled migrants often pay 
more than a year’s worth of future income (International 
Labour Organization (ILO), 2017; KNOMAD, 2017), 
reducing their ability to send remittances. Migration 
costs tend to be higher for the low-skilled (ILO, 2017; 
KNOMAD, 2017) and are more likely to prevent the poor 
from migrating. Migration costs also tend to be higher 
for migrants from more remote areas, who are also more 
likely to be poorer (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). This 
relationship holds at the national level as well: countries 
with low GDP per capita have lower emigration rates 
(OECD, 2016), to some extent due to aspiring migrants 
being unable to finance migration. 
Loans can facilitate the payment of pre-departure 
and recruitment costs. However, with imperfect credit 
markets in poorer areas, this can result in aspiring 
migrants borrowing high sums of money15 from informal 
lenders, often at exorbitant interest rates. This places poor 
households in a risky situation, and raises the stakes for 
the migrant: an ‘unsuccessful’ migration, which produces 
low returns (and hence low remittances), makes it difficult 
for the household to meet loan repayments and eventually 
free itself from debt. The most vulnerable can get caught in 
debt-bondage when they are trapped in exploitative work 
situations after taking a loan to pay for recruitment costs 
and/or an advance (e.g. Zeitlyn et al., 2014 on India).
Studies have shown that migration becomes more 
pro-poor when costs decrease, e.g. through strengthened 
13. There may also be psychosocial costs of migration, however these are not discussed here. For an overview of migrant happiness and wellbeing, see IOM 
(2013) and Hendriks (2015).
14. Passport costs vary widely, costing as much as US$300; in at least 14 countries a passport costs more than 10% of average annual per-capita income 
(Gibson and McKenzie, 2011a).
15. For instance, one study shows that the average migration loan of migrants in Rolpa, Nepal, is 97% of average annual household expenditure (Hagen-
Zanker et al., 2014).
16. More information on these can be found in other briefings in this series, including on living conditions of urban migrants (Lucci et al., 2016) and those 
displaced by climate change (Wilkinson et al., 2016), access to health services (Tulloch et al., 2016), and access to social protection (Hagen-Zanker et al., 
2017).
migration networks (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007; 
Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). The policy discussions in 
this area have mostly focused on fair recruitment (see 
Box 3), but have also considered how to improve access 
to pre-departure migration loans. For instance, at the 
Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) 
in 2009, bank-non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
partnerships were discussed, where banks would provide 
loans at reasonable interest rates, as well as transparent 
information about the migration process (Martin, 2009). In 
Bangladesh, the NGO BRAC has funded close to 200,000 
migration loans, also providing additional pre-departure 
services such as contract reviews (BRAC, 2016). The policy 
recommendations of former UN Special Representative for 
Migration Peter Sutherland (the ‘Sutherland Report’) call 
for migrant welfare funds to issue such loans.
Finally, the cost of sending remittances back home can 
lower their potential for reducing poverty. Studies have 
shown that fees for migrants remitting to sub-Saharan 
Africa average 12% of the amount transmitted (Watkins 
and Quattri, 2014). These excess fees cost the African 
continent US$1.8 billion a year, which would cover the 
primary-school education of 14 million children in the 
region (ibid.). The need to reduce remittance fees is now 
firmly rooted in policy discussions, being an explicit target 
in the 2030 Agenda (see Target 10.C) as well as more 
specifically in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 
‘Sutherland Report’. Mobile remittances are seen as one 
way forward to reduce costs (Box 2).
4.2 Poor conditions in host countries can undercut 
expected benefits from migration
Migration doesn’t always offer the rewards anticipated. 
Conditions in host countries can entrench poverty of 
migrants, including poor living conditions and limited 
access to services,16 low wages, and poor working 
conditions. 
Sometimes, wages paid by employers are lower than 
promised, or not paid at all (see Donini et al., 2013; 
Hagen-Zanker et al., 2014; Maher, 2009). Wages can be 
irregular, particularly for those in the informal economy, 
making it difficult for migrants to sustain themselves in the 
host community and send remittances back home. Female 
migrant workers are especially over-represented in lower-
paid, irregular work (ILO, 2017; O’Neil et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, migrants may not be able to make full use 
of their education and skills as access to skills-recognition 
processes tend to be lacking, especially for low- and 
medium-skilled workers (ILO, 2017). This can lead to 
deskilling or ‘brain waste’ and migrant workers earning 
less than anticipated. Compared to natives, migrants face 
wage gaps that cannot be explained fully by differences 
in education, work experience and language skills (ILO, 
2015). 
Second, migrants often experience poor working 
conditions, which can lead to lower earnings and adverse 
health outcomes. Migrant workers are more likely to hold 
jobs that are ‘dirty, dangerous and difficult’ (ILO, 2017). 
Migrant workers are much less likely to have ‘decent-
work benefits’ such as a contract, occupational health 
and safety, and fundamental labour rights (Aleksynska et 
al., 2017).17 Migrant workers are at greater risk of being 
victims of forced labour (ILO, 2017). They are also more 
likely to experience work-related accidents and diseases 
17. See also a review of working conditions for internal migrants in Lucci et al., 2016.
18. See Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017 for a review of social-protection coverage of migrants.
19. In total this represented approximately 630 million people who would like to migrate internationally, dwarfing the current estimated international-
migrant stock of 244 million (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), 2015).
20. For example, limited administrative capacity in the Congo means not enough passports are produced year on year to meet demand (Gibson and 
McKenzie, 2011).
21. This figure lists legal restrictions; other countries also restrict mobility for certain ethnic or political sub-groups due to political reasons.
(Belin et al., 2011; ILO, 2017). This is especially relevant 
for those who are undocumented and/or working in the 
informal economy, who are also less likely to be protected 
through social-insurance schemes.18 As such, migrants may 
lose extended periods of time to illness, can end up with 
disabilities that limit future earning potential or, in extreme 
cases, lose their lives. Box 3 gives examples of emerging 
best practices on how to combat poor working conditions 
using fair recruitment. 
4.3 Barriers to mobility 
So far, we have focused on the factors that limit the 
poverty reduction potential for those who are already on 
the move. What about those who would like to move, 
but are unable to do so? This ‘involuntary immobility’ (as 
coined by Carling, 2002) characterises many poor areas 
and origin countries. In a global survey, 14% of the world’s 
adults said they would like to move to another country.19 
Of those surveyed, 33% were in sub-Saharan Africa, 21% 
in the Middle East and North Africa, and 20% in Latin 
America (Esipova et al., 2011). However less than half of 
these respondents had already started making preparations 
(ibid.). The evidence suggests that those who would benefit 
the most from migration are often unable to do so. Part of 
this can be explained by the debilitating costs of migration 
discussed above. However, there are also policy barriers 
that prevent people from migrating legally, which diminish 
the potential of migration to reduce poverty.
Barriers set by origin countries
Some of these barriers are set, perhaps surprisingly, 
by origin countries. Some have extensive bureaucratic 
requirements, including procuring documents and 
participation in pre-migration trainings and health checks, 
that act as indirect barriers to exit.20 Poorer and less-
educated individuals can find it challenging to navigate the 
complex bureaucratic requirements. This in turn reduces 
their ability to migrate and increases their dependency on 
brokers, which drives up the cost of migration. 
Furthermore, some origin countries place legal 
restrictions on their citizens that prevent them from 
leaving. Some countries enact exit-visa schemes, others 
prohibit citizens from leaving if their intention is to 
migrate. Some countries place travel restrictions on women 
or on citizens of national-service age (see Figure 121), and 
others temporarily ban migrant workers from travelling to 
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Box 2: Mobile remittances to reduce costs
One innovative way to reduce the cost of 
remittances is to use mobile money-transfer options. 
A recent study on using mobile transfers found that 
it drastically reduces costs: using mobile transfers 
is on average more than 50% cheaper than using 
money-transfer operators (MTOs); in 45 country 
corridors surveyed, the average cost of sending 
US$200 using mobile money was 2.7%, compared 
to 6% with MTOs (GSMA, 2016). 
Mobile remittances have the potential to be more 
inclusive than other transfer methods, as they allow 
smaller remittance values to be sent more cheaply, 
which is important for poorer migrants. The same 
study showed the average value of mobile money 
transfers was US$82, while across other channels 
this was approximately US$500 (ibid.). Moreover, 
mobile money can foster greater financial inclusion, 
by tapping into migrants’ ownership and usage of 
mobile phones to include them in digital financial 
services. Finally, the increasing use of mobile money 
fosters competition in the market, leading to greater 
transparency and further driving down transfer 
costs. This includes traditional MTOs, which tend 
to lower their fees when forced to compete against 
mobile-money competitors. 
Poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development  9 
certain countries, allegedly for safety reasons or to protect 
their rights.22 
Preventing individuals from migrating can deny them 
the potential for poverty reduction and negatively affect 
their households. For example, a study in Indonesia 
showed that banning female domestic workers from 
emigrating to Saudi Arabia led to an increase in poverty 
of between 2% and 3% in households in migration origin 
communities, as well as a decline in female employment 
and labour-force participation (Makovec et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, the bans that are intended to protect 
potential migrant workers from rights violations can 
backfire; in some cases, they have been associated with an 
increase in irregular labour migration and trafficking. 
Barriers set by host countries
Then there are barriers set by host countries limiting legal 
pathways for migration. Host countries employ different 
legislative and policy instruments to manage the overall 
number of immigrants and nature of migration. Many of 
these instruments prevent and restrict migration, which 
means that the demand far outstrips places available, 
particularly in the most desirable host countries. For 
22. Ethiopia bans unskilled workers travelling to the Middle East, and the Philippines restricts or bans labour migration to more than 10 Middle Eastern and 
sub-Saharan countries. Travel bans for migrant domestic workers are common; for example, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines and Sri Lanka 
have had temporary bans on domestic workers migrating to several Middle Eastern countries.
instance, the US temporary visa for skilled migrants has 
a cap of 65,000 annually, which was reached within the 
first week in each of the past five years (Trautwein, 2017). 
Likewise, only about 0.5% of applicants for a diversity 
visa received it (State Department, 2017). In the UK, skilled 
Tier 2 visas are capped at 20,700 per year; in 2015 the 
monthly cap of 1,650 was reached within 11 days (West 
and Ali, 2015). 
Some evidence suggests that national migration policy 
regimes have become less restrictive over the past 50 years, 
at all skill levels (de Haas et al., 2016). Other analysis 
suggests that work-related entry channels in four European 
countries (France, Italy, Spain, the UK) have become more 
restrictive, especially with respect to low-skilled migration 
(Consterdine et al., 2017). While overall policy trends 
are disputed, country-level analysis shows that over the 
past two decades, more restrictive policies have started to 
dominate in traditional host countries, e.g. Australia and 
the US (de Haas et al., 2016). 
The nature of migration policies has changed too, 
becoming increasingly selective based on skills, with fewer 
opportunities for poor and less-skilled aspiring migrants 
(Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). Selective immigration 
Box 3: Policy measures on fair recruitment
International labour standards apply to the recruitment of migrant workers. Effective implementation of fair 
recruitment measures involves extensive policy coordination amongst governments, labour recruiters and 
employers alike. The following are some emerging practices:
1. Some host countries state costs are to be paid by the employer, while origin countries may cap recruiter fees 
(ILO, 2017). Nepalese practice combines this; the ‘free visa, free ticket’ policy ensures migrants pay no more 
than NPR20,000 (US$184) to private employment agencies, and the employer pays for tickets and visas (von 
Rohland and Crozet, 2017).
2. To ensure workers are given clear, transparent contracts, standardised employment contracts can be attached to 
labour agreements between countries, as in the 2008 Sri Lanka-Qatar agreement (Wickramasekara, 2015), and 
registered with authorities in the host country, as in some Gulf countries (ILO, 2017).
3. Some countries such as Bangladesh and Ethiopia have joint liability provisions to ensure recruiters and 
employers can be held liable for workers’ rights violations during recruitment (ILO, 2017).
4. Private-sector initiatives play a growing role. The Consumer Goods Forum (CGF) recently introduced its 
Three Priority Industry Principles and guidance to tackle forced labour and abusive recruitment. More global 
companies are joining the Leadership Group, launched in 2016 under the Institute for Human Rights and 
Business (IHRB), to promote responsible recruitment and ethical supply chains (CGF, 2017; IHRB, 2016).
5. More companies are following due-diligence procedures in supply chains, for example, US government agencies 
(United States Office of the Federal Register, 2012) and Colgate-Palmolive and Marks & Spencer’s (CGF, 2017).
6. Once migrants are abroad, some cities have taken the initiative to protect their employment rights. Barcelona’s 
authorities help migrants with employment through its immigrant reception service, SAIER (Saier Servicio de 
Atención a Inmigrantes, Extranjeros y Refugiados), which supports migrants with job-seeking, training and 
education, and offers legal advice (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2017). In the US, ‘sanctuary cities’ can help protect 
irregular labour migrants (Ridgley, 2008). 
policies facilitate the entry of skilled workers, but are also 
used to justify the discrimination and/or denial of rights 
to low-skilled workers (de Haas et al., 2016). This has 
direct implications for the potential of migration to reduce 
poverty as it prevents the low-skilled who are more likely 
to be poor from accessing regular migration pathways. It 
also potentially causes ‘brain waste’ amongst those who are 
slightly better off and can afford to finance migration and 
who can access regular migration pathways, but then often 
end up working in low-skilled jobs in host countries(ibid.). 
Restrictive policy regimes reduce the opportunities 
for regular migration in the first place, but they can also 
deflect migrants towards irregular migration channels. 
For instance, a study looking at Eritrean migrants in 
Ethiopia showed that as people lose hope in the formal 
processes and channels, the risks involved in irregular 
23. See also Medam (2017) for more examples.
transit become tolerable (Mallett et al., 2017). Likewise, 
a study in 29 European countries showed that more 
restrictive temporary visa schemes push migrants towards 
irregularity: a 10% increase in short-stay visa rejections 
leads to a 5% increase in irregular migration (Czaika and 
Hobolth, 2014).23 As irregular migration is more costly and 
risky, it has a lower potential to reduce poverty, and makes 
the original point of barriers moot. 
Restrictive migration policies are likely to remain on the 
policy agenda of many desirable host countries, but there 
are policy entry points. Circular and seasonal migration 
schemes have been put forward as a ‘realistic’ policy 
solution (Foresti, 2017), opening up more opportunities 
for regular and safe migration, particularly for those with 
lower skills levels (see Boxes 1 and 4).
Figure 1: Legal restrictions in origin countries on the international mobility of citizens 
Source: Country reports in US Department of State (2016)
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5 Conclusions and policy recommendations
The potential benefits of international labour migration 
have been described as the equivalent to ‘finding 
trillion-dollar bills on the side-walk’ (Clemens, 2011). 
The very essence of labour migration lies in the huge 
income-differentials that exist globally: a worker from 
a low-income country can earn significantly more in a 
high-income country, thus being able to improve standards 
of living for their families, with multiplier effects in both 
host and origin countries. In other words, migration is a 
hugely powerful poverty-reduction instrument and is key 
to meeting SDG 1 and other Goals. 
Keeping in mind the 2030 Agenda principle of ‘leaving 
no-one behind’, the evidence makes a powerful argument 
for creating opportunities for mobility for citizens of poor 
countries, particularly the poorest, who often cannot 
afford the high costs of migration. Schemes that foster 
labour mobility should be seen as complementary to other 
development programmes and considered an important 
item in the toolbox for reducing poverty.
Yet the role that mobility can play is mostly absent 
from the discussions on poverty reduction. This is because 
migration is a ‘difficult’ policy instrument. The effects of 
migration are not always immediate and public attitudes 
to migration are often negative (Dempster and Hargrave, 
2017), which makes it tough for policy-makers to propose 
new policy instruments within short-term political 
cycles. Migration often fails to achieve its full poverty 
reduction potential due to the high costs of migration, 
poor conditions in host countries, and barriers to mobility. 
Furthermore, when regular migration channels are not 
in place, aspiring migrants make use of irregular ones, 
with lower benefits for both host countries and migrants 
themselves. 
It is therefore in everyone’s interest for migration to 
happen safely and legally, in a regulated rather than a 
clandestine way (UN, 2017). To achieve this, the 2030 
Agenda can provide the policy framework, as well as the 
necessary political ‘traction’, in different member states and 
in the multilateral system.
The recommendations below set out key actions 
for national governments in host and origin countries, 
international institutions and civil-society organisations 
to maximise the poverty reduction potential of migration. 
This is key for to achieving the SDG targets on poverty 
reduction and, leaving no-one behind.
Conclusion 1: Migration is one of the most successful 
ways to reduce poverty, and is therefore crucial to 
achieving SDG 1 and other Goals. 
Recommendation: Allow poor families and 
households to benefit from migration.
 • The benefits of migration are greater for migrants and 
host countries when it takes place through safe, regular 
and orderly pathways: expand and diversify them 
(see Conclusion 3). Origin countries should provide 
information about regular migration pathways, and 
run pre-departure training to facilitate migration and 
maximise its benefits. 
 • Safeguard the rights of migrant workers, including those 
working informally, particularly when they are not 
protected by national labour laws. Work proactively to 
eliminate abusive recruitment, and encourage greater 
scrutiny of global supply chains (see Box 3). These 
efforts should take a multi-stakeholder approach and 
involve governments of origin and host countries, as 
well as other actors including the private sector and 
local authorities.
Box 4: New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer programme
The Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) programme began in 2007, aiming to ease labour shortages in 
New Zealand’s horticulture and viticulture industries by admitting up to 5,000 seasonal workers (in the first 
instance), giving preference to those from Pacific countries. Promoting development in the Pacific Islands is an 
explicit goal of RSE. It is considered a success; a rigorous multi-year evaluation showed it had a significant and 
multidimensional impact on poverty reduction for participating migrants and their households in Tonga and 
Vanuatu. 
In both countries, per-capita income of households with an RSE migrant rose by over 30% relative to non-
migrant households, and in Tonga, households doubled their savings (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014). Over 
two years, households in Vanuatu who reported having a bank account rose from 55% to 74% (ibid.), which 
is thought to reflect more formal savings practices. Subjective economic welfare increased significantly for 
households in both countries. Participating households in both countries purchased more durable assets, and in 
Tonga they were almost twice as likely as non-RSE households to make a home improvement. Moreover, school-
attendance rates increased by 20% for 16- to 18-year-olds in Tonga.
 • Female migrant workers also contribute to sustainable 
development, but owing to gender-based barriers 
they are less likely than men to make the most of the 
economic and social opportunities of mobility. Policy 
measures should focus on regulating and improving 
working conditions for all female migrant workers 
(O’Neil et al., 2016).
 • Establish supportive institutions that can help families 
who stay behind adapt to the loss of an economically 
active member or caregiver through migration. 
Interventions should be tailored to the length and type 
of migration in question; options could include putting 
in place safety nets to improve health and education 
outcomes for children in the community, including those 
of migrant children, and introducing accessible banking, 
credit, investment and insurance systems (Démurger, 
2015).
 • Foster and encourage remittances and other forms of 
diaspora finance. Remittances can be a key resource 
for poverty reduction, while diaspora investment 
can contribute to broader economic growth in origin 
countries (see Gelb, forthcoming). Bilateral and 
multilateral organisations have a role to play too, 
for instance in matchmaking investors/lenders in the 
diaspora with borrowers in the home country (including 
the government, businesses or individual households) 
as well as leveraging and complementing diaspora 
investment.
 • Policy-makers in donor countries should view 
development aid and migration as complementary. It 
is possible to achieve aid objectives (such as poverty 
reduction) through mobility, while at the same time 
benefitting host countries (Clemens and Postel, 2017). 
At a more granular level, aid can be used to facilitate 
skills-training programmes specifically linked to 
mobility opportunities (see Clemens, 2014), provide 
information to aspiring migrants (e.g. on regular 
migration pathways), improve conditions for migrants 
in so-called transit countries, and more.
 • The relationship between migration and poverty 
reduction is complex: while the evidence shows that 
migration tends to reduce poverty, the mechanisms 
are often difficult to disentangle (Antman, 2012). 
Therefore, more rigorous research is needed to isolate 
these mechanisms, so that policies can be targeted more 
effectively. Better longitudinal data could also help to 
clarify the range of impacts migration has on migrants 
and their families, at different stages of the process.
Relevant SDG targets
1.1: By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people 
everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than 
$1.25 a day.
1.2: By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, 
women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its 
dimensions according to national definitions. 
1.4: By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular 
the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic 
resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and 
control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, 
natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial 
services, including microfinance. 
1.5: By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those 
in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and 
vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other 
economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters. 
8.1: Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance 
with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per 
cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least 
developed countries.
8.8: Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure 
working environments for all workers, including migrant 
workers, in particular women migrants, and those in 
precarious employment.
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Conclusion 2: The high cost of migration makes it 
harder for the poorest to migrate. 
Recommendation: Reduce the pre-departure, 
recruitment and travel cost of migration, improve 
access to loans, and lower the transaction costs of 
migrant remittances.
 • Origin countries should take action to reduce the pre-
departure costs of migration, as they burden the poorest 
the most. For instance, passports should be made 
available more easily and at a lower cost. Pre-departure 
loans, at reasonable interest rates from a regulated 
provider, can help, alongside information about the 
migration process. Such loans must be fully transparent 
and legal, and the migrant must have sufficient financial 
knowledge to assess adequately the implications of 
taking a loan. 
 • Governments should better regulate and monitor 
recruitment agencies, encouraging professionalisation 
and transparency in the industry, for example holding 
agencies accountable by publishing their performance 
and ratings. Additional efforts could include 
cooperation and agreements with large employers 
dependent on migrant labour, and bilateral coordination 
between origin and host countries on enacting the 
principles of ‘fair recruitment’.
 • Lowering the transaction costs of remittances has 
been on the policy agenda for years. The focus now 
has to move from rhetoric to action, ensuring more 
partnerships between MTOs, policy-makers, regulators 
and other stakeholders, and to set up enforceable 
agreements, such as the African Postal Financial Services 
Initiative (APFSI, 2016).
Conclusion 3: There are insufficient safe, regular and 
orderly migration pathways diminishing the potential 
of migration to reduce poverty.
Recommendation: Increase and diversify safe, regular 
and orderly migration pathways to achieve greater 
poverty reduction benefits for migrants themselves, 
their families, and their host and origin countries.
 • Origin countries must remove barriers to migration. 
They should support their citizens who want to migrate 
by providing information on the migration process and 
consular support to those in host countries. They should 
also help those who return, for instance by providing 
attractive investment opportunities.
 • Temporary/seasonal migration has a high poverty 
reduction potential and can have more political traction 
in host countries than permanent schemes. These 
schemes should be expanded, learning lessons from 
existing pilots (for instance between Haiti and the US, 
and Tonga and New Zealand.
 • Many high-income countries have a strong demand for 
labour at different levels of skill. To ensure a reliable 
supply of appropriately trained individuals, host 
countries could set up training institutions in origin 
countries. Initiatives such as a Global Skills Partnership 
could combine skills and job training with embedded 
mobility schemes (Clemens, 2014). They would also 
help to maximise the benefits of migration for migrants 
and origin countries.
 • Citizens from the poorest countries have the most to 
gain from migration, yet are often less able to access 
regular migration pathways. Countries with a points-
based immigration system could give extra points for 
migrants from low-income countries, to increase their 
likelihood of obtaining a visa. Additional measures 
could focus on skills matching and skills recognition.
Many thanks to Pietro Mona (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)), Melissa Siegel (University of Maastricht), Emma Sammon, Helen 
Dempster, Marta Foresti and Stephen Gelb (all ODI) for comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks to Sophy Kershaw for editing and Sean Willmott for design.
Relevant SDG targets
1.a: Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a 
variety of sources, including through enhanced development 
cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable 
means for developing countries, in particular least developed 
countries, to implement programmes and policies to end 
poverty in all its dimensions.
10.c: Reduce transaction costs of migrant remittances.
Relevant SDG targets
1.b: Create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional 
and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-
sensitive development strategies, to support accelerated 
investment in poverty eradication actions.
10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration 
and mobility of people through the implementation of planned 
and well-managed migration policies.
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